Deference, expertise and information-gathering powers by Chan, C
Title Deference, expertise and information-gathering powers
Author(s) Chan, C
Citation Legal Studies, 2012, p. 1-28
Issued Date 2012
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/148851
Rights The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2066022
1 
 




This article explores two questions. First, in adjudicating claims under the Human Rights Act 
1998, should the court defer to the executive or legislature on the ground that the latter two 
institutions possess superior expertise or information-gathering powers, when such expertise 
or powers fail to generate persuasive first-order reasons for the court? This article argues 
that rationality requires courts to defer on these second-order grounds of institutional 
capacity in situations of judicial uncertainty. Secondly, this article examines an 
underexplored question in the current literature: when is it justified for courts to consider the 
government as possessing second-order grounds of institutional capacity that warrant 
deference? It is argued that rational, impartial and open adjudication in the post-HRA era 
requires the government to prove its claims of superior institutional capacity, and courts to 
openly scrutinise such claims by considering a number of factors, including, crucially, the 




The Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA’), with its increased powers of judicial scrutiny, has 
ignited heated debates on judicial deference in the UK. The grounds of deference contested 
include institutional capacity, democratic legitimacy and prudential concerns.1 This article 
will focus on examining the debate on two aspects of the ground of institutional capacity: (1) 
expertise and (2) information-gathering powers. Deferring for these two factors seems the 
least controversial issue in the debate. Supporters of ‘due deference’ such as Murray Hunt, 
Aileen Kavanagh, Jeff King and Alison Young, argue that assigning weight to views 
generated by superior expertise and relevant information is a requirement of rationality and 
part of ordinary judicial function.2 Some even claim that the strongest opponent to deference 
                                                 
*Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. The author would like to thank Trevor Allan, 
Janice Brabyn, Tony Carty, Joseph Chan, Peter Chau, Richard Cullen, Helen Fenwick, Lusina Ho, Puja Kapai, 
Jacqueline Law, Mingchiu Li, Leticia Tang, Scott Veitch, Po Jen Yap, the two anonymous reviewers and 
participants at the Society of Legal Scholars Annual Conference 2011. 
1 Although there are overlapping considerations regarding these three grounds of deference, there are distinct 
concerns too and it is possible to discuss these grounds separately. 
2 M Hunt,  ‘Sovereignty’s  Blight:  Why  Public Law  Needs  “Due  Deference”  in  N  Bamforth and P Leyland (eds) 
Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) 337, pp 353-354; AL  Young,  ‘In  
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– TRS Allan – can side with them on this.3 Indeed in various places Allan seems to have 
conceded this point.4 So what is left for us to discuss? 
This article will examine this apparently resolved debate by discussing two issues. First, 
in adjudicating claims under the HRA, should the court defer to the executive or legislature 
on the ground that these institutions possess superior expertise or information-gathering 
powers, when such expertise or powers fail to generate persuasive reasons for the court on 
the merits of the case? This, I argue, is the central issue that divides Allan and due deference 
supporters in the debate on deference on the ground of institutional capacity. Whilst both 
sides agree that courts should defer when expertise and information-gathering powers 
generate persuasive first-order reasons, they differ on whether courts should defer for these 
factors as second-order reasons, ie when such factors fail to produce convincing reasons on 
the legal merits. In particular, contrary to due deference supporters, Allan considers it 
illegitimate to defer on second-order grounds in any situation because courts should only 
enforce their own balance of first-order reasons. This article will put forward a case against 
Allan on this contentious issue. Assuming that second-order grounds of institutional 
competence are established, rationality calls for deference thereon at least in the limited 
situation where courts are uncertain what the legal answer is. 
Secondly, this article will explore when it is justified for courts to consider the 
government as possessing second-order expertise and information-gathering powers that 
warrant deference in HRA cases. This is an important question that is underexplored in the 
current literature. Institutional superiority is not always self-evident. The practical 
implications and hence the justifiability of any theory of deference on second-order grounds 
would only be apparent if the theory contains an account of when such grounds can be taken 
to have been established. As I will later on explain, some prevalent accounts of deference, 
whilst making the right start in acknowledging that deference on second-order grounds is 
sometimes called for, are ultimately unjustified due to their flawed approach to establishing 
such grounds. Further, recent blunders in governance, including not least the intelligence 
                                                                                                                                                        
Defence  of  Due  Deference’  (2009)  72(4)  MLR  554 at 555, 570; A Kavanagh,  ‘Defending  Deference  in  Public  
Law and Constitutional  Theory’ (2010) 126 LQR 236 at 244-245. 
3 Young, ibid, at 574; Kavanagh, ibid, at 243-244, 249-250.  Jowell supports in principle deference on the 
ground   of   institutional   competence.   J   Jowell,   ‘Judicial   Deference   and   Human   Rights:   a   Question   of  
Competence’  in  P  Craig  and  R  Rawlings  (eds),  Law and Administration in Europe: Essays in Honour of Carol 
Harlow (Oxford:  OUP,  2003)  p  67;;  J  Jowell,  ‘Judicial  Deference:  Servility,  Civility  or  Institutional  Capacity?’  
(2003) PL 592. 
4 As will be explained in section 1, Allan endorsed this point only in relation to deference on first-order grounds, 
but not that on second-order   grounds.   TRS  Allan,   ‘Human  Rights   and   Judicial   Review:  A   Critique   of   “Due  
Deference”’   (2006)   65   CLJ   671   at   672,   676;;   TRS   Allan,   ‘Judicial   Deference and Judicial Review: Legal 
Doctrine  and  Legal  Theory’  (2011)  127  LQR 96 at 97, 103, 105. 
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failure over Iraq, give us reasons to question traditional presumptions about government 
expertise and credibility.5 It is particularly important in this day and age to ask when it is 
legitimate for courts to consider government institutions as experts and rely uncritically on 
the  latter’s  judgments.  
Unfortunately, none of the scholars supporting deference on second-order grounds of 
institutional capacity have systematically addressed when such grounds can be taken to have 
been established. This article will attempt to sketch an answer to this question, taking into 
account the requirements of rational, fair and open adjudication in the post-HRA era. I argue 
that the burden of proving claims of superior institutional capacity rests with the government, 
and the court must openly scrutinise such claims by considering a number of factors, 
including, crucially, the government institution’s track record of expertise and credibility.  
This  article  will  adopt   the  definition  of   ‘deference’  given  by  due  deference supporters, 
namely,  the  assigning  of  varying  degrees  of  weight  to  an  institution’s  views.6 ‘Government’  
will be used in this article to refer to the executive or legislature.  
In the following, I will first expound the distinction between deference for first-order as 
opposed to second-order reasons. I will then explain why deference for second-order reasons 
is sometimes justified. Next, I will suggest factors which courts should consider in evaluating 
whether the government possesses second-order institutional competence, and the burden of 
proof and manner of scrutiny that ought to be adopted. Following from this, I will address 
some potential objections on feasibility against my proposals. Finally, I will conclude with 
some observations on the current debate on due deference. 
 
1. UNCOVERING THE BATTLELINE: DEFERENCE ON SECOND-ORDER GROUNDS 
 
This article deploys the distinction between first-order, substantive reasons and second-order, 
institutional reasons.7 The former relate to the legal merits of the particular case in question, 
based on which the court makes its own determination of rights. The latter are concerns of 
institutional  competence,  democratic  legitimacy  and  prudence,  which  do  not  affect  the  court’s  
                                                 
5 Feldman convincingly challenged   presumptions   about   politicians’   superior   institutional   competence   in  
assessing terrorism-related   risks   in   ‘Human  Rights,  Terrorism  and  Risk:   the  Roles  of  Politicians   and   Judges’  
(2006) PL 364 at 377-384.  See  also  T  Poole,  ‘Courts  and  Conditions  of  Uncertainty  in  “Times  of  Crisis”’  (2008)  
PL 234 at 244-258; C Walker, ‘The  Threat  of  Terrorism  and   the  Fate  of  Control  Orders’   [2010]  PL 3 at 15; 
below n 95-100. 
6 Kavanagh, above n 2, at 223, 233; Young, above n 2, at 555; Hunt, above n 2. 
7 Kavanagh, above n 2, at 230; S Perry,  ‘Second-order Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal  Theory’  62  S Cal L Rev 
913 (1988-89); J Raz, Practical Reasons and Norms (London: Hutchison, 1975) ch.1. 
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own substantive determination of the legal merits. Following due deference theorists, this 
article will treat second-order   reasons   as   ‘reweighting reasons’.8 If a court defers to the 
government on second-order grounds, it will be treating the government’s   case   as   stronger  
than what the court, on its own balance of first-order reasons, considers it to be.9 
Building on this distinction, I would like to highlight an overlooked point in the current 
literature – a point that will illuminate what unites and sets apart the two camps in the debate 
on due deference,  namely  that  the  government’s  expertise  and  intelligence-gathering powers 
can  figure  in  the  court’s  reasoning  process  as  first- or second-order reasons. Let us look at the 
government’s  information-gathering powers first, before turning to consider expertise. If the 
government is able to demonstrate its superior information-gathering ability by disclosing the 
relevant information to the court, and the court is persuaded by such information on the legal 
merits,   then   the   government’s   information-gathering powers would be factored into the 
court’s   first-order reasoning. Yet if the government is unable to disclose to the court (not 
even on a confidential basis) the information which it claims can ground its conclusions,10 its 
information-gathering powers will be unable to generate persuasive reasons on the 
substantive merits. If the court nevertheless gives weight to the conclusions that are founded 
upon   the   undisclosed   information,   then   the   government’s   information-gathering powers 
would  figure  in  the  court’s reasoning as a second-order reason. 
As  for  the  government’s  expertise,  if  it  generates  convincing  reasons  for  the  court  on  the  
legal merits of the particular case in question, then it will be relevant as a first-order reason. 
The   government’s   expertise   will be ‘subsumed within’ the   court’s   first-order analysis.11 
However, if the expertise fails to generate such convincing reasons but is nevertheless given 
weight by the court, then it will be relevant as a second-order reason. Claims of second-order 
expertise usually take the form of the government, generally, having expertise in deciding the 
type of issue in question. The claim is that even if the government cannot demonstrate that it 
is correct on the merits of this particular case, the fact that it was usually correct in the past in 
deciding this type of issues is a reason that warrants deference this time. This distinction 
                                                 
8 As opposed to exclusionary reasons, above n 6. Perry, ibid, at 932; cf J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988) ch 3; P Soper, The Ethics of Deference (Cambridge: CUP, 2002) pp 38-47; D 
Dyzenhaus,   ‘The  Politics  of  Deference:   Judicial  Review  and  Democracy’   in  M Taggart (ed) The Province of 
Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997) p 286. 
9 Perry, above n 7, at 932; Kavanagh, above n 2, at 233.  
10 The kind of situation described here should be distinguished from two other circumstances: (1) where 
information is hidden from the litigant but not the court, as in what happens when the closed material procedure 
is used; (2) where the government conceals information under public interest immunity and does not seek to rely 
on  such  information  in  the  trial.  The  latter  two  situations  are  not  the  subject  of  this  article’s  concern.     
11 Allan, above n 4 LQR, at 99-100. 
5 
 
between first- and second-order reasons is thrown into relief by two House of Lords 
decisions. In Re E (a child),12 in deciding whether the police has discharged its positive 
obligations under art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights in protecting the 
claimant’s   child   from   loyalist   violence   that   broke   out   on   the   child’s   path   to   school,   the  
majority’s  reasoning  displayed  an  example  of deference for first-order reasons of expertise. 
Lord  Carswell  argued   that  weight   should  be  assigned   to   the  police’s  views  on  how   to  deal  
with  the  riot  since  the  police’s  expertise  generated  persuasive  reasons  on  the  legal  merits  of  
this particular case.13 The police offered evidence to show that clearance of the group using 
conventional crowd tactics had been tried but backfired. The police also argued that arrest by 
force had been hindered by the landscape of the surroundings. In the end the court was 
persuaded   by   the   police’s   view   that   a   negotiated   settlement   was   necessary   in   the  
circumstances.14 The  government’s  experience  generated  persuasive  reasons  that  swayed  the  
court’s  own  substantive  reasoning. 
In   contrast,   the  House   of   Lords’   reasoning   in   the   first part of the Belmarsh judgment 
exhibited an example of deference on second-order grounds of expertise.15 On the question of 
whether there was a ‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’ that justified the 
government’s  derogation   from   the  bar   against indefinite detention, the majority deferred to 
the decision of the executive, partly because it believed that the executive generally 
possessed more expertise in making political judgments, national security decisions and 
predictions of human behaviour.16 The alleged general expertise did not translate into 
persuasive reasons for the court on the legal merits of this specific case, in particular, for the 
late Lord Bingham, who had ‘misgiving’ about,  and  Lord  Scott,  who  had  ‘very great doubt’, 
whether such emergency existed in the circumstances.17 Indeed   it  seems   that   the  majority’s  
own balance of reasons would not have found the requisite level of emergency. 
Considerations   of   the   executive’s   general   expertise   in  making   national   security   judgments  
added extra  weight  to  the  government’s  case,  and  functioned  in  the  majority’s  calculation  as  a  
second-order reason. 
It   is   uncontroversial   that   the  government’s   expertise   and   intelligence-gathering powers 
should attract weight if they can generate convincing first-order reasons. Supporters of due 
                                                 
12 Re E (a child) [2008] UKHL 66. 
13 Ibid at [55-59]. 
14 Ibid.  
15 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (‘Belmarsh’). 
16 Ibid at [26, 29, 116, 154, 166, 226].  
17 Belmarsh, at [26, 154]. 
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deference and Allan agree on this.18 This unison accounts for the apparent harmony between 
the two camps and  the  alleged  ‘concessions’  that  Allan  made  on  the  issue  of  deference.19  
The real contention between Allan and due deference supporters lies in whether judges 
should give weight to official expertise and information-gathering powers that fail to generate 
convincing first-order reasons. Perhaps with the exception of Hunt who is more ambiguous 
on this issue,20 the due deference camp clearly accepts that such deference is sometimes 
warranted. Kavanagh makes this argument most explicitly. According to her, courts have a 
duty to balance substantive reasons against institutional ones. The two levels of reasoning are 
‘conceptually  separate’:  questions  of  institutional  capacity  cannot  be  answered  by  substantive  
arguments about the legal merits.21 Kavanagh, King and Young all envisage situations of 
judicial  uncertainty,  where  the  government’s  expertise  fails  to  tilt  the  court’s  balance of first-
order reasons in favour of the government, but where, they argue, the court should 
nonetheless give weight to such expertise.22 
In contrast, Allan  objects  to  deference  for  reasons  that  are  extraneous  to  the  court’s  first-
order reasoning. The court should take into account superior competence only insofar as it is 
demonstrated by convincing arguments or evidence tailored to the circumstances of the case. 
A bad argument for breaching rights will not be strengthened by the fact that it is made by a 
well-informed institution.23 
 
2. RATIONALITY AND DEFERENCE ON SECOND-ORDER GROUNDS 
 
The dispute between the two camps stems from their fundamentally different starting 
premises. Allan’s  premise  is  that  courts  should  always  only  act  on  their  own  balance  of first-
order reasons. If they defer on second-order grounds, they would abdicate judicial 
responsibility and impartiality and inhibit the growth of a culture of justification. Since 
deference theories ask courts to act for second-order reasons, Allan concludes that these 
                                                 
18 Hunt, above n 2, p 340; Young, above n 2, at 575; A Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human 
Rights Act (Cambridge: CUP, 2009) pp 187-189; Allan, above n 4 CLJ, at 689; Allan, above n 4 LQR, at 106; 
TRS Allan, ‘Deference,   Defiance,   and   Doctrine:   Defining   the   Limits   of   Judicial   Review’   (2010)   60   U   of  
Toronto LJ 41-59, at 48. 
19 Young, above n 2, at 574-575; Kavanagh, above n 2, at 243-244, 249-250; Allan, above n 4 LQR, at 96, 97, 
103, 105; Allan, above n 4 CLJ, at 672, 676. 
20 The cases that Hunt cited as displaying due deference all seemed to be illustrations of deference to expertise 
as first-order reason. Hunt, above n 2. 
21 Kavanagh, above n 2, at 231, 232, 250; A Kavanagh,  ‘Judicial  Restraint  in  the  Pursuit  of  Justice’  (2010)  60  U  
of Toronto LJ 23 at 31-32. 
22 Kavanagh, above n 2, at 233-235; J King,  ‘Institutional  Approaches  to  Judicial  Restraint’  (2008)  28(3)  OJLS 
409, at 438-9; Young, above n 2, at 566, 570, 573.   
23 Allan, above n 4 CLJ, at 688-689; Allan, above n 18, at 51. 
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theories call for such abdication and inhibition.24 On the other hand, the starting premise of 
due deference supporters is that courts should sometimes defer on second-order grounds.  
I   argue   that   Allan’s   premise   is   untenable.   Assuming   that   second-order reasons of 
expertise and intelligence-gathering powers are validly established,25 deference for such 
reasons  is  justified  at  least  in  the  limited  situation  where  the  court  is  uncertain  which  side’s  
arguments are more convincing. This occurs when   the   court’s   own   balance   of   first-order 
reasons is (1) even (when arguments for and against finding an unjustified rights violation, or 
a related specific factual or normative assessment, are finely balanced to the court) or (2) 
unclear (where due to epistemic limitations the court is unsure of the weight of one or both 
sides’   arguments).26 Although Allan disagrees with some due deference supporters in 
insisting that there is in principle one right answer in every legal case,27 he in fact envisages 
such situations of uncertainty as he accepts that there may be reasonable epistemic 
disagreements over what the correct answer may be.28 
In these situations of judicial uncertainty, rationality requires the court to defer to the 
institution whose subjective balance of first-order reasons is more likely to be correct, ie 
more likely to resemble the objective balance of first-order reasons.29 If the government is 
able to establish that it has better expertise than the court in deciding the type of issue in 
question, or that it has more information than the court does to decide the issue, there are 
reasons to believe that the government is more likely than the court to get it right, and the 
obvious course for the court would be to defer.30 Deference to an institution that possesses 
superior  expertise  or  knowledge  is,  as  Kavanagh  emphasises,  ‘a  rational  response  to  [judicial]  
uncertainty’.31 
An  analogy  can  be  drawn  with  courts’  treatment  of  conflicting  expert  opinion.  The  case  
law confirms that while courts choose among competing opinions primarily according to the 
                                                 
24 Allan, above n 18, at 42; Allan, above n 4 LQR, at 100, 101, 109; Allan, above n 4 CLJ, at 688.  
25 Sections 3 will explain when courts can consider such reasons as being established. My arguments also 
assume that the government body and the court are dealing with the same question, an issue raised in B Foley, 
Deference and the Presumption of Constitutionality (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2008) p 278.  
26 Judges have acknowledged that rights cases before them are finely contested. For recent judgments, see Quila 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 148, at [52-62]; Regina (Mohamed) v 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs No. 2 (Guardian News and Media Ltd and ors 
intervening) [2011] QB 218, at [290]; Regina (Ghai) v Newcastle City Council (Ramgharia Gurdwara, Hitchin 
and others intervening) [2010] 3 WLR 737, at [121-123].  
27 King, above n 22, at 413, 425-426; Young, above n 2, at 576. 
28 Allan, above n 4 LQR, at 102. For the distinction between indeterminacy and uncertainty, see S Besson, The 
Morality of Conflict (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) pp 53-39. 
29 Perry, above n 7, at 929.  
30 A similar point was made in T Hickman, Public Law after the Human Rights Act (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2010) p 142. 
31 Kavanagh, above n 18, pp 171-172. 
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cogency of their reasons, the ‘impressiveness   of   an   expert’s   qualifications   and   experience’  
are  ‘always relevant’ in  the  courts’  evaluation,  and  may  attract  extra  weight  that  determines  
the outcome.32 This is highly intuitive,  as  an  expert’s  qualifications  and  past  experience  are 
relevant to the likelihood of him being correct in the instant case. If two competing expert 
opinions seem equally cogent to the court, or, if the court is uncertain about the weight of one 
or both opinions, then the fact that one is given by a highly distinguished expert and the other 
by a less well qualified and experienced expert should logically act, respectively, as a tie-
breaker or pointer. 
In the landmark case on medical negligence, Bolitho,33 the House of Lords had to decide 
whether the defendant doctors had been negligent in failing to intubate a child. There was 
competing and comparably strong medical evidence on what should have been done. The 
court ultimately found for the defendants, and it was clear that the court attached much 
weight to the impressive qualifications of the main expert witness for the defendants, whom 
the   court   called   ‘a most distinguished expert’.34 Similarly, in a recent case on competing 
expert evidence, Keran Louise Henderson,35 the Court of Appeal, in deciding which 
competing expert opinion to rely on in a suspected case of child abuse, discounted the weight 
attached to the evidence of one expert since  ‘his  experience  was  more  historic…  he  has  not  
conducted autopsies…  for  many  years…’36 
Analogically, in constitutional rights review, if courts are uncertain what the balance of 
first-order reasons requires, and some additional factor suggests that the government is more 
likely to be correct, no rational court should resist deference to the government. 
One interpretative point before we move on  to  consider  Allan’s  objections  to  deference.  
Some  may  interpret  Allan’s  theory  as  being  able  to  accommodate  the  proposed  deference  to  
second-order expertise and intelligence. This   reading   is   buttressed   by   Allan’s  
acknowledgment that judicial uncertainty can affect the degree of permissible discretion: 
‘The court will obtain its sense of the limits of permissible interference from the degree of 
confidence about the most appropriate response that their study of the competing claims 
permits  them  to  acquire.’37 I contend that Allan is simply reinforcing the point that ordinary 
                                                 
32 For recent cases, see Hassan Masood v Aileen Kerr & ors [2010] EWCA Civ 1347; Leicestershire County 
Council v W & P [2002] EWCA Civ 710. T Hodgkinson and M James, Expert Evidence: Law and Practice 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd edn, 2010) pp 386-390;;  Lord  Woolf,  ‘Are  the  Courts  Excessively  Deferential  to  
the  Medical  Profession?’  (2001)  9  Medical  Law  Review  1,  at  10-11. 
33 Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1997] 3 WLR 1151. 
34 Ibid at [244]. 
35 Keran Louise Henderson v The Crown [2010] EWCA Crim 1269. 
36 Ibid at [61]. 
37 Allan, above n 4 LQR, at 111. 
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judicial analysis of particular claims of rights can allow different margins of discretion to the 
government, and that there is no need for a separate doctrine of deference. This and other 
similar statements of his cannot be read as permitting deference on grounds that fail to 
produce convincing first-order reasons, as this would fly in the face of (1) his repeated 
emphasis that the court should only bow to expertise insofar as it generates persuasive 
reasons for curtailing rights in the particular case;38 and (2) his insistence that there should 
not be  principles  of  deference  ‘operating independently’ from detailed, contextual analysis of 
‘specific claims of  right…  in  accordance  with  their intrinsic merits.’39 Any attempt to defend 
Allan’s  theory  as  being  receptive  to  the  proposed  deference  on  second-order grounds would 
have to be squared with these unequivocal remarks.  
Allan raises three main objections against deference on second-order grounds. First, he 
argues that if the court defers for second-order reasons, it would abdicate its duty to enforce 
its   ‘own   best   judgment   of   a   party’s   legal   rights’.40 The court violates the rights that it is 
supposed to enforce by allowing extraneous considerations to displace its own appraisal of 
substantive reasons.41 My  reply  is,  it  may  be  true  that  the  court’s  primary  duty  is  to  enforce  
its own determination of legal rights. However,  in  cases  where  the  court’s  subjective  balance  
of first-order  reasons  fails  to  return  an  answer,  the  court’s  best judgment can only be made on 
the basis of other reasons that suggest which institution is more likely to produce correct 
answers. Second-order reasons of expertise or information-gathering powers assist courts in 
finding out, rather than compel them to set aside, the right answer.42 If the court turns a blind 
eye to the superior expertise of the government or to information which the government is in 
a  unique  position  to  possess,  it  runs  the  risk  of  enforcing  the  ‘wrong  rights’.43 
Allan’s   second   objection   is   that   deference   for   second-order reasons calls for an 
abandonment of judicial impartiality.44 Whatever logic deference may yield in other contexts, 
it has no role to play in adjudication, which should proceed on the basis of reasons applicable 
to the case in question.45 Denying  a  claimant  its  rights  merely  ‘in  virtue  of  his  comparative  
ignorance   or   lack   of   special   qualifications’   goes   against   ‘adjudication as an institutional 
expression   of   the   influence   of   reasoned   argument   in   human   affairs’.46 Allowing the 
                                                 
38 Allan, above n 4 CLJ, at 676, 683, 689; above n 4 LQR, at 107. 
39 Allan, above n 4 CLJ, at 672, 674, 675, emphasis added. 
40 Allan, above n 4 LQR, at 101; above n 4 CLJ, at 688. 
41 Allan, above n 4 LQR, at 100, 109. 
42 See  T  Hickman,  ‘The  Substance  and  Structure  of  Proportionality’  (2008)  PL  694  at  697. 
43 Young, above n 2, at 576. 
44 Allan, above n 4 CLJ, at 676. 
45 Ibid at 692-693. 
46 Ibid at 693. 
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government to more easily discharge its burden of proof on the basis of factors that are 
extraneous to the legal merits gives the government an unfair advantage. Unfairness is 
aggravated by the fact that the litigant will have no opportunity to challenge extraneous 
expertise or information that is not demonstrated by argument.47 
This  relates  to  Allan’s  third  objection,  that  deference  is  inimical  to the development of a 
‘legal   culture  of   justification’.48 If the government is able to get by with general claims of 
expertise and information-gathering powers that are unable to specifically justify its 
conclusions in the particular case, then the court is granting   the   government’s   conclusions  
without requiring them to be fully justified.  
These  arguments  seem  powerful,  but  are  misguided.  It  is  not  clear  why  the  government’s  
burden of proof can only be discharged with reasons and evidence that directly apply to the 
case,  and  the  government’s  general  expertise  and  exclusive  access   to   information  can  never  
assist in tipping the balance of proof. If the court is unsure which viewpoint is more 
persuasive, and the government can demonstrate its track record of getting it right in this type 
of cases and its credibility regarding claims of useful secret intelligence information, then 
such established institutional  competence  should  logically  add  strength  to   the  government’s  
case. Such deference does not corrupt the reasoned nature of adjudication: institutional 
competence itself needs to be established by reasons and evidence, and giving weight to 
established institutional competence aids the court to pick the right reasons to rely on. The 
litigant is free to challenge  the  government’s  evidence of expertise and credibility. The court 
is  not  being  partial,  nor  is  the  government’s  conclusion  allowed  to  stand  without  justification,  
since the form of deference proposed here requires the government to fully prove that it 
possesses institutional advantages that render it more likely to reach the right answer in the 
present case. 
 
3. ESTABLISHING SECOND-ORDER REASONS 
 
So far I have argued that courts, in adjudicating claims under the HRA, should defer on 
second-order institutional grounds in situations of judicial uncertainty, if such grounds are 
established. The crucial question then becomes, when is it justified for courts to consider such 
grounds as having been established? The question is no longer whether courts should defer to 
a government body that is more likely to be correct. Rather, it is under what circumstances 
                                                 
47 Ibid at 692. 
48 Ibid at 694. 
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courts can legitimately consider a government institution as being more likely to be correct, 
where  the  latter  fails  to  tilt  the  former’s  balance  of  first-order reasons. 
In the following, I will outline an answer to this underexplored question based on the 
imperatives of rational, impartial and transparent adjudication in the post-HRA landscape. I 
will build on an insight of Poole that has not yet been fully explored. In an important article, 
Poole argues that in terrorism cases involving risks and secrecy, public reason requires courts 
to challenge the  evidential  basis  of  the  government’s  assessments.49 Courts should not merely 
embrace, sidestep or ignore risks; instead, they must try to gain access to as much 
information as possible and find ways of testing it.50  
I will elaborate on why courts should adopt this  probing  attitude  to  test  the  government’s  
claims of second-order institutional competence, and how such probing should be 
undertaken.  I do not seek to propose a universal, timeless formula for assessing institutional 
competence – which is neither desirable nor possible, since what it takes to establish 
institutional capacity varies on a case-by-case basis, across subject areas51 and with the nature 
of the question involved.52 What I will do, instead, is to suggest factors which courts must 
consider in deciding whether they can   rely  on  a  government’s   judgment,   the  circumstances  
that may affect the weight of these factors, and the burden of proof and manner of scrutiny 
that should be adopted. As will be seen, although I accept that deference on second-order 
grounds of expertise and information-gathering powers is sometimes called for, the rules of 
adjudication under the HRA demand a high threshold to be crossed before such grounds can 
be taken to have been founded. 
 
(a) Burden of proof and manner of scrutiny 
 
Under the HRA, the government bears the burden of proving the proportionality of any prima 
facie infringement of rights. This reflects the value we attach to rights: any encroachment 
must only be made to the extent necessary, and the government must fully justify any 
infringement. The logic that follows is, if at the justification stage the government wishes to 
claim that it possesses second-order grounds of institutional competence that deserve 
                                                 
49 Poole, above n 5, at 253-259. 
50 Ibid at 248-258. 
51 Although most cases discussed in this article are concerned with national security (since second-order reasons 
are most prominently relied on by the government in this context), my arguments are intended to apply to HRA 
cases of all subject matters. 
52 Eg whether it is a determination of facts, risk assessment or moral judgment. 
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deference – eg useful information that cannot be revealed to the court, and/or general 
expertise in the subject area – then it must prove that this is the case.  
If courts work  from  what  Poole  calls  a  ‘presumption of good faith’,53 granting claims of 
superior expertise and information-gathering powers without requiring them to be fully 
proved, they would distort the game: they would   lighten  the  government’s  burden  of  proof, 
giving it an unfair advantage. Moreover, presumptions of good faith jettison the ‘sceptical 
habit of mind that should always underpin… judicial review’.54 Judicial fairness and the 
culture of justification require the government to adduce evidence to prove its claims of 
institutional capacity.  
If   the   government   fails   to   tilt   the   court’s   first-order balance (resulting in judicial 
uncertainty) and further fails to prove second-order grounds for deference, then it would have 
to lose since it has not discharged  its  burden  of  proof;;  it  has  failed  to  ‘earn’  deference.55 
Of course, that the government fails to show that it has superior institutional abilities 
does not entail that the court is in any better position than the government to determine the 
issue; the court may be as incapable of making the decision. Yet this is no reason for 
deference. The burden is on the government to convince the court that it is rights-compliant. 
The court need not show that it has superior institutional competence before ruling against the 
government. Where the latter fails to convince the court on both first- and second- order 
levels, the court ought to rule against it on the basis that it has failed to discharge its onus.56 
As explained in section 2, the court should consider the   government’s   second-order 
claims of superior institutional abilities in situations of judicial uncertainty. Here impartiality 
and open justice would require courts to openly scrutinise the evidence supporting these 
claims, and to explain to the litigant why such second-order claims for deference have or have 
not been granted, eg what makes the court believe that the institution indeed possesses 
general expertise in this area, or the said secret intelligence? Otherwise, the litigant would 
have no opportunity  to  challenge  the  court’s  decision  to  defer  – a decision which would most 
likely have accounted for why the litigant has lost. As Poole contends, the duty of candour 
requires courts to openly confront   and   not   just   cast   doubt   on   (‘sidestep’) unreliable risk 
                                                 
53 Poole, above n 5, at 249. 
54 Ibid at 250. 
55 This expression was coined by Hunt, above n 2, p 340. 
56 Thus   Komesar’s   general   account   of   relative   institutional   competence,   while   helpful,   cannot   be   nakedly 
transposed to the debate on deference under the HRA, since it omits to consider the burden of proof in rights 
adjudication. NK Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
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assessments.57 If   open   justice   requires   the   court   to   openly   evaluate   the   parties’ first-order 
arguments and to explain its conclusions thereon, it would similarly require the court to 
expressly scrutinise the evidence supporting second-order claims of institutional capacity and 
to fully explain why deference therefor has or has not been granted.  
 
(b) Factors for courts to consider 
 
The basic idea of rational decision-making is that conclusions must be grounded in reason 
and not blind faith. Where the government alleges that it possesses useful secret information 
or general expertise on a subject, it would only be rational for courts to grant these claims if 
there are reasons to show that they are true. Since second-order grounds of expertise and 
information-gathering powers cannot persuade the court on the legal merits, they are by 
nature unsupported by concrete reasons applicable to the case. Courts should therefore 
consider relevant factors extrinsic to the case in assessing whether to trust that the alleged 
expertise or information exists. It is ultimately for the courts to weigh up these factors. The 
overarching test must always be: taking into consideration all relevant factors, is the 
government’s   claim   of   useful   secret   information   or   superior   expertise in the subject area 
worthy of trust? Deference theorists have suggested the following factors for courts to 
consider:58 
1. Whether the institution possesses features (eg procedures, powers, resources, systems 
of accountability) that would facilitate its arriving at right answers. 
2. The nature and extent of scrutiny by the institution of the decision in question. 
 
These are indisputably relevant factors. However, a crucial omission from the list is the 
institution’s   past   record of expertise and credibility.59 This refers to past incidents that 
demonstrate   the   institution’s   ability   to make the type of judgments in question and its 
integrity in claiming possession of useful information that cannot be revealed.  
Rationality requires a court to consider a government institution’s past performance and 
credibility when determining whether the institution indeed possesses the alleged useful 
                                                 
57 Poole, above n 5, at 250-251. 
58 See eg Hunt, above n 2, p 353; Kavanagh, above n  18 at 182-190; Young, above n 2, at 565-567; King, above 
n 22. See also Jowell in Craig and Rawlings (eds), above n 3, p 80; J Raz,  ‘Disagreement in Politics’ 43 Am J 
Juris 25 (1998) at 45-46; L Fuller  and  K  Winston,  ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’ 92(2) Harvard Law 
Review 353 (1978); Komesar, above n 56. 
59 Komesar alluded that history may be important for assessing institutional competence. Yet this factor seems 
to have played a small role in his theory. Komesar, above n 56, p 259.  
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secret information or general expertise. Let us examine expertise first. Whilst institutional 
features are relevant to establishing general expertise in making particular kinds of 
judgments, track records of performance are equally, if not more, important, and cannot be 
ignored. What combination of institutional features would more likely render correct 
outcomes in a particular time and place cannot be determined in the abstract and must be 
tested by experience. Courts need to consider whether the institution had in the past made 
correct judgments in the area concerned, in order to ascertain if its institutional features in 
fact make it more likely to arrive at right answers. For instance, the Security Service certainly 
possesses the institutional feature of being staffed by people who are experienced in 
analysing intelligence. However, whether these people will properly make use of their powers 
and   responsibly   learn   from   experience   in   light   of   the   institution’s   current   accountability  
mechanisms can only be confirmed by track records.60 That past performance is needed to 
verify if an institution is functioning adequately is particularly true in the context of national 
security, because defence strategies become out-dated quickly.61 It was explicitly admitted by 
the former head of the Security Service that the organisation must earn public trust from track 
records.62  
If a court ascertains expertise solely by looking at institutional designs without 
considering whether they worked, it would be relying on mere presumptions about the link 
between the possession of certain institutional designs and the ability to generate right 
answers, without testing whether such presumptions are in fact valid in the circumstances. 
This is equivalent to drawing conclusions from hypotheses without conducting experiments 
in scientific research. 
Looking  at  an   institution’s  past  performance   to  ascertain   if   it   is   an  expert is extremely 
intuitive once we revisit the analogy with expert opinion. Courts assess the professional 
expertise of doctors by examining their past performance, qualifications and reputation. If a 
doctor had repeatedly committed medical blunders in the field, say, misdiagnosed patients, or 
suffers from a bad reputation for publishing flawed findings in the field, courts would 
                                                 
60 Various commentators have argued that the government has vested interests in playing up national security 
risks. See eg F de Londras, Detention  in  the  ‘War  on  Terror’:  Can  Human  Rights Fight Back? (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2011) chs 1, 3.  
61 The Coalition government recently accused the Blair government of not adapting our defence institutions to 
suit  new  circumstances.  ‘A  Strong  Britain  in  an  Age  of  Uncertainty:  the  National  Security  Strategy’  (Foreword)  
and  ‘Securing  Britain  in  an  Age  of  Uncertainty:  The  Strategic  Defence  and  Security  Review’  (Foreword),  both  
presented to Parliament in October 2010, available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/. 
62 Transcript of the James Smart Lecture by the former Director General of the Security Service, Eliza 




(rightly, in my opinion) doubt if he really is an expert in the area and would choose to trust 
more reliable expert witnesses. There is no reason why government institutions should be 
exempt from this rational process of locating expertise, especially when something as 
important as potential violations of rights is at stake. As with dealing with other experts, 
courts ought to confirm if government institutions are experts on a certain matter by 
considering whether they had made correct decisions.63 
I now move on to examine information-gathering powers. A court ought to consider an 
institution’s  past credibility in deciding whether to trust the latter’s conclusions made based 
on concealed evidence. The court should consider  the  institution’s  credibility  in  two  senses:  
(1)   the  competence  sense:  whether   the   institution’s   sources  of   information and assessments 
made based on that information had been reliable in the past, and (2) the good faith sense: 
whether the institution had been honest in claiming possession of useful information that 
could not be disclosed. Also, courts must consider if there is indeed a compelling need to 
conceal information from them.64 If the government body’s  sources  of  intelligence  had  been  
unreliable, or if it had repeatedly lied about its intelligence or exaggerated risks, it would not 
be rational for courts to trust it this time – the simple tale of the boy who cried wolf. If the 
court relies on conclusions made based on unrevealed evidence without considering the 
government   institution’s   record   of   trustworthiness,   it   would   be   trusting   the   government’s  
mere assertions that it possessed certain useful information. 
Mere presumptions or assertions about superior institutional competence may turn out to 
be false. This   partly   explains   why   academics   have   unanimously   rejected   the   ‘spatial’  
approach to deference, whereby courts carve out certain subject matters that would 
automatically attract deference (eg national security) and others that do not (eg fundamental 
rights).65 This approach is problematic, partly because  presumptions  about  the  government’s  
                                                 
63 It may be objected that the analogy with expert opinion is flawed. In situations of competing expert testimony, 
the judge is choosing between the evidence of two experts; whereas in public law cases the judge is choosing 
between the views of an expert government body and that of a non-expert litigant. In the former situation, it is 
justified for the judge to reject one expert view, as he can choose to rely on another expert view. In contrast, in 
public  law  cases,  if  the  judge  rejects  the  government’s  expert  view,  he  would  have  to  rely  on  the  litigant’s  non-
expert view. In the latter situation, it would hardly be justified for the court to reject the government’s  expert  
view unless there are strong grounds for doing so. My reply is, the analogy is applicable in the situation under 
discussion,  in  which  the  government  and  the  litigant’s  first-order arguments are equally strong, or the court is 
uncertain which side’s  arguments  are  stronger.  These  are  situations  where  the  government  is  unable to 
demonstrate its relative expertise through first-order reasons. My argument is precisely that in these situations, 
courts ought not automatically assume that the public body possesses relative expertise, and may only defer if 
the government can prove that this is the case.     
64 Poole argues that courts must try to gain access to as much information as possible. Poole, above n 5, at 254. 
65 Eg Hunt, above n 2, pp 345-347; Kavanagh, above n 18, at 201-203; King, above n 22 at 421, 417-418; 
Young, above n 2 at 566; Jowell, above n 3;;  RA  Edwards,   ‘Judicial  Deference  under   the  Human  Rights  Act’  
(2002) 65(6) MLR 859 at 863-864. 
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superior institutional competence in wholesale subject areas may prove to be wrong in 
context. If courts accept claims of general expertise and useful secret information based on 
mere presumptions or assertions without considering whether these claims are supported by 
experience, they would be exercising a leap of faith – trusting in something without asking 
for proof that it is trustworthy. Courts exercising such a leap are irrational and abdicate their 
responsibility to enforce their best judgment of rights. 
Not all past incidents should attract equal  weight  in  the  court’s assessment of reliability. 
The weight of the past record would depend on the degree of resemblance the past judgment 
bears to the present judgment, the recentness of the past incident, and how particularised the 
incident is. 
 
(c) Establishing second-order reasons: flawed approaches 
 
Neglect of the above requirements of rationality, fairness and open justice has led at least two 
prevalent accounts of deference to have supported deference in situations where it is 
unjustified.   King’s   account   suggests   that the   government’s   institutional   capacity can be 
presumed and hence need not be openly established. This is shown by his argument that 
judicial uncertainty and fallibility in and of itself calls for deference.66 In situations of 
uncertainty, one would only rationally defer to another if there are grounds to believe that the 
latter is more likely to be correct on the question. This is admitted by King, whose 
‘institutional  approach  to  restraint’  focuses  on  the  relative strengths and weaknesses of courts 
in solving problems.67 However, that judges are ignorant, uncertain, or fallible does not 
automatically entail that the government fares any better on the same question. Let us assume 
that the government claims that it possesses useful intelligence which shows that the litigant 
is a terrorist. If the government refused to reveal such intelligence, the court would operate in 
conditions of uncertainty. Yet this uncertainty is no proof that the government indeed 
possesses the said intelligence. Whether the court can legitimately consider the government 
as possessing such information depends on other factors, including, I argue, the government’s  
credibility. King recognises the importance of history in ascertaining whether courts are 
fallible:  ‘[W]ell-known history’ shows  that  ‘courts  will  get  things  wrong’.68 Yet he critically 
misses the more important side of the equation in rights adjudication:   the   government’s  
                                                 
66 King, above n 22 at 411-414, 425-426. 
67 Ibid at 410. 
68 Ibid at 411. 
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competence on a particular matter needs to be proved by performance as well. To advocate 
the  slogan  ‘if in doubt, defer’ is to presume that the government possesses superior expertise 
and knowledge on an issue whenever the courts are in doubt. This breaches rationality, 
fairness and open justice under the HRA. 
Kavanagh’s  account, on the other hand, emphasises that courts must not be presumed to 
have inferior competence.69 However, her analysis of case law exposes her endorsement of 
deference even when the basis for deferring is not openly demonstrated to the litigant.  
Kavanagh uses the case of Farrakhan to illustrate that it is justified for courts to defer 
where the case is finely balanced, and there is an information gap between the government 
and the court.70 The Home Secretary refused to allow Farrakhan to enter the UK to address an 
audience, claiming that non-discloseable intelligence showed that his presence would 
endanger public order. The Court of Appeal regarded the legal merits as evenly balanced but 
upon affording a wide margin of appreciation to the Home Secretary due partly to his ‘far 
better’ position in reaching an informed judgment,71 found that the impugned decision was 
justified.  The  court  did  not  openly  consider  the  reliability  of  the  executive’s  risk  assessments  
and intelligence sources, nor did it expressly probe the purported need to keep intelligence 
secret from the court. On the face of it, the court simply trusted the government. Kavanagh 
remarked that the fact that the court in Farrakhan was ‘prevented from seeing relevant 
information’ was of ‘crucial importance’ and justified deference.72 Her acceptance that there 
was indeed relevant secret  intelligence,  and  of  the  need  to  defer  to  the  government’s  ‘superior 
information-gathering powers’, shows that for her, deference is warranted even when the 
basis for trusting that the alleged intelligence exists is not demonstrated to the litigant. 
Similarly, Kavanagh cites Gillan to show that deference is justified when the court 
cannot review relevant evidence.73 The House of Lords had to decide whether certain blanket 
stop and search powers were proportionate in countering terrorism. Lord Scott observed that 
the court could not question the assessments made by the police and Home Secretary of the 
seriousness of terrorist threats, because it was prevented from seeing useful intelligence 
material.74 The court did not openly consider the credibility of the organs involved in 
claiming  possession  of  useful  information  that  could  not  be  disclosed.  Kavanagh’s  defence  of  
                                                 
69 Kavanagh, above n 2, at 226; above n 18, at 175, 182, 219. 
70 Kavanagh, above n 2, at 234-235; The Queen on the Application of Louis Farrakhan v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2002]  EWCA  Civ  606  (‘Farrakhan’). 
71 Farrakhan at [73].  
72 Kavanagh, above n 2, at 234-235, emphasis added. 
73 Kavanagh, above n 18, pp 214-215; R (Gillan) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2006] 2 AC 307. 
74 Gillan, ibid, at [62]. 
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the   court’s   deferential   approach   shows that for her, courts can legitimately defer without 
expressly explaining the basis for believing that the said intelligence exists.  
Belmarsh was used by Kavanagh to demonstrate the need for deference when the court is 
uncertain and the government possesses superior expertise and intelligence-gathering powers 
in making national security decisions.75 As explained in section 1 above, in adjudicating 
whether there was a public emergency threatening the life of a nation, the majority deferred 
on second-order grounds of official expertise in making national security judgments. The 
majority also deferred on the ground that the executive was able to consider material that the 
Lords were not invited to see.76 When   seeking   to   rely   on   such   ‘expertise’   and   secret  
information, the majority (with the exception of Lord Scott who noted, but ultimately 
dismissed   without   justification   the   significance   of,   the   ‘faulty   intelligence   assessments’  
regarding Iraq77)   seemed   to   have   presumed   a   link   between   the   executive’s   possession   of  
certain institutional features (eg staff experienced in making risk assessments) and its ability 
to make correct judgments. It did not explicitly inspect whether this link was confirmed by 
recent experience. Nor did the majority expressly consider whether the government had 
previously been credible in claiming that it had useful secret intelligence material. 
Apparently,  it  simply  took  the  government’s  word  (that  it  possessed  useful  intelligence  in  this  
case)  for  it.  Kavanagh’s  citing  of  the  court’s  judgment  on  this  issue  to  demonstrate  the  need  
for deference in light of relevant secret intelligence and official expertise in judging 
anticipatory and life-and-death national security questions,78 shows that for her, courts can 
grant the existence of institutional grounds for deference without expressly vetting the 
evidence supporting these grounds. 
The  trilogy  of  cases  discussed  concerns  the  credibility  of  the  government’s  intelligence  
sources and assessments on national security. What the positive evidence was that enabled 
the courts and Kavanagh to establish such credibility in those cases – including overcoming 
negative evidence of such credibility79 – remained in the dark. There was no opportunity for 
the litigants in those cases to challenge the evidence and reasoning behind the generous dose 
of deference that crucially led to their defeat on the issues concerned.  Kavanagh’s  sanction  of  
deference in these cases violates judicial impartiality and open justice.  
 
                                                 
75 Kavanagh, above n 18, pp 212-213, 215-218. 
76 Belmarsh at [27, 94, 117, 226]. 
77 Belmarsh at [154]; Poole criticised  the  court  for  ‘sidestepping’   risks, above n 5, at 250. 
78 Kavanagh, above n 18, pp 212-218. 
79 See below n 95-100. 
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My track record proposal may be objected on the basis that it will unduly extend the litigation 
process and impose a heavy burden on the government. My reply is three-fold. First, we must 
put things in perspective. I am not saying that track records must be proved and examined in 
all HRA cases. The government need only establish its past reliability if it seeks to rely on 
secret information or expertise that cannot generate persuasive first-order reasons, and courts 
only need to examine such records when their balance of first-order reasons is even or 
unclear. Cases that meet these conditions, thus attracting the extra hurdle of track records, are 
likely to be few.80    
Secondly, the government can avoid taking on the burden of proving reliability by not 
relying on second-order institutional grounds for deference. One benefit of my track record 
proposal is that it will provide incentives for the government to try, from the outset, to limit 
the breadth of non-disclosed information and to proffer reasons applicable to the case. If the 
government does not want to prove second-order reasons, it will try to perfect its first-order 
reasons. Either way, transparent and fair adjudication is enhanced.  
Thirdly, it is possible to devise rules to make the process of examining credibility 
manageable. My proposal envisages that rules governing what types of evidence relating to 
past performance are admissible and how such evidence can be used can be developed by 
courts and through legislation over time. By way of suggestion, the following procedure can 
be adopted: 
 
1. First, the government is to adduce positive evidence to show that the institution which it 
is asking the court to defer to had previously made correct judgments in the type of issues 
concerned, and/or that its sources of information were reliable in the past.  
2. The litigant then has an evidential burden to expose negative records of the government 
body’s credibility, and point out the institutional problems that these blunders expose. If 
the   litigant   is   unable   to   point   to   any   negative   track   record,   then   the   government’s 
credibility can be taken to have been established by step 1. 
                                                 
80 This is especially so with the introduction of closed-material procedures in certain contexts, under which 
evidence can be revealed to the court in confidence. Above n 10. 
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3. If the litigant can discharge its evidential burden, the government must then try to show 
that the asserted institutional problems exposed by past mistakes have been solved or are 
not applicable in the present case. The government may also give evidence to show that 
the alleged problems have been misidentified. Ultimately it is for the court to decide 
whether on balance the government has sufficiently overcome the alleged negative 
record. 
 
Apart from placing an evidential burden on the litigant (step 2 above), two other procedural 
rules may also help simplify the process of assessing track records. One is to admit track 
records for up to a certain period of time only, for instance, up to ten years before the 
litigation. Another is to introduce a rebuttable presumption. As positive judicial assessments 
of a   government   body’s   expertise   in   a   certain   type   of   issues   accumulate over time, a 
rebuttable presumption of the requisite competence for that type of questions may be 
developed, and the government need not go through step 1 all over again when that kind of 
questions arises. The presumption is rebutted if the litigant is able to raise contrary evidence 




My proposal may be objected on the basis that it is not feasible. First, in national security 
contexts – situations where second-order grounds for deference will most likely be raised – it 
is inherently most difficult for the government to adduce sufficient evidence for the court to 
assess past reliability, because much of such evidence cannot be released for public security 
reasons. It is unlikely that track records can be established in these contexts. Secondly, even 
if courts are given enough information to assess past performance, they are not capable of 
making the assessment in relation to government bodies. Such an assessment is often 
complex, involving evaluation of the history of a large institution (eg the Ministry of 
Defence), which is reliant on information gathered by another large institution (eg the 
Security Service).    
The first argument may be true, but even if it is, it does not weaken my case. All my 
theory aims to do is to explicate the condition for legitimate deference on second-order 
institutional grounds, namely, that such grounds must be backed by evidence. It does not 
follow from my theory that this condition will be met in all cases. In fact it is envisaged that 
such a high threshold for legitimate deference will not be met in some cases. If in a national 
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security case the government is unable or unwilling to adduce enough evidence to prove that 
it is reliable, then according to my theory, the threshold for legitimate deference is not 
crossed and the court should simply not defer. If in reality the government is rarely able or 
willing to prove past credibility in national security cases, then according to my theory, this 
simply goes to show that deference on second-order grounds is rarely warranted in these 
contexts of secrecy. This conclusion may be surprising given that I started off defending 
deference on second-order grounds at a philosophical level, but it does not weaken the value 
of my thesis: that it explicates when deference on second-order grounds is called for, hence 
explaining why deference is or is not legitimate in specific circumstances.  
Once we reflect on the imperatives of rational, open and fair adjudication that underlay 
my theory, it will not come as a surprise that deference on second-order grounds is warranted 
exceptionally in the murky world of national security. Intelligence agencies and risk-
assessing bodies work in conditions of relative secrecy. The public and courts hear much 
about these  institutions’ failures, but know little about their quiet successes. Deferring to bold 
claims of general expertise and useful secret intelligence in these circumstances would 
amount to exercising a giant leap of faith – trusting that these bodies are reliable when there 
is abundant (if not, only) evidence to the contrary. Such a leap blatantly violates the spirit of 
rights adjudication. Asking the government to earn deference by showing credibility in 
national security contexts may sound harsh, but is entirely justified. The government is not 
absolved from the responsibility to earn trust from courts merely because national security is 
involved.81 If it demands trust, it must proffer evidence to show that it is trustworthy. The 
bottomline is, courts should never grant unconditional trust in judicial review. 
Although I acknowledge that it may be difficult to prove credibility in national security 
cases, I would not overestimate such difficulty. We currently believe that establishing track 
records in national security cases is hard, because we have no idea how the exercise can be 
conducted, in particular, what kinds of information can be adduced for such purposes. We 
have never seen track records being established. My proposal will urge intelligence and risk-
assessing institutions to try their best to prove credibility, by limiting non-discloseable 
information to what is truly absolutely necessary. Experience shows that the government will 
do better with pressure. Partly in response to criticisms from the Intelligence and Security 
Committee (‘ISC’)   in 2009,82 the government has compiled and released details of those 
                                                 
81 A Tomkins,  ‘National  security  and  the  role  of  the  court:  a  changed  landscape?’  (2010)  126  LQR  543,  at 567. 
82 Intelligence and Security Committee, ‘Could 7/7 have been prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the 
London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005’,  presented to Parliament in May 2009, paras 284-285. 
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convicted for terrorism offences for the past ten years – data that was previously 
unavailable.83 This   is   a   ‘simple,   yet   essential’ piece of evidence that can demonstrate how 
well our intelligence institutions are functioning,84 and the ISC contributed to prompting its 
release. Judicial interrogation may be able to compel the government to disclose useful 
departments of information that had never been within our cognizance. Proving past 
reliability in national security cases may seem arduous today, but may turn out to be less 
difficult than we thought, as the government engages more frequently with the exercise. Just 
decades ago it was considered unworkable even for courts to challenge judgments made in 
the name of national security. Now no one would doubt that this judicial exercise is feasible. 
‘Peering through the glass darkly’ may not be as difficult as it seems,85 because the glass may 
turn out to be brighter. My proposal is another step to making what will remain as the most 
sensitive part of our democracy more accountable.  
The second objection is false. Courts are fully capable of assessing the credibility of 
government bodies. In fact, some judges have already been doing so. In Belmarsh, Lord 
Hoffmann (dissenting judge on the first issue) and Lord Scott referred expressly to the Iraq 
failure  when  evaluating  whether   to   trust   the  executive’s   judgment  on   the  public  emergency  
question (although neither judge explained why they were willing to grant the Home 
Secretary  the  ‘benefit  of  the  doubt’  notwithstanding the problems exposed by the Iraq saga).86 
The increasingly activist attitude of courts in national security cases87 is also suggestive. One 
reason   behind   this   attitude   might   be   the   government’s   recent   intelligence   failures   and  
misjudgements88 – wake-up calls that show that the government can go wrong in this area. 
There are thus signs to show that serious blunders such as Iraq have prompted some judges to 
begin to consider, albeit not always in a systematic and explicit fashion, the UK 
government’s track records, questioning orthodox presumptions about official competence; 
and this article is simply calling for the rationalisation and open articulation of an existing 
thought process. 
                                                 
83 In 2009, the ISC requested statistics from 2004 onwards but the government said detailed convictions data 
was only available from 2007. Detailed statistics are now available at the Home Office’s  website: 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/science-research/research-statistics/;  notable terrorist convictions since 2001 are 
summarised  on  the  Security  Service’s  website: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/terrorist-plots-in-the-uk.html.  
84 Above n 82, paras 289-290. 
85 Poole analogises courts’  probing  of  national  security  claims  to  them  ‘peering through the glass darkly’. Poole, 
above n 5, at 258. 
86 Belmarsh, at [94, 96, 154].  
87 See cases in n 90, 95, 97; Al Rawi v Security Service [2010] EWCA Civ 482; AF (No.3) [2009] UKHL 28; 
The Queen of the Application of Naik v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 1546. 
See De Londras, above n 60, pp 230-279.  
88 Below n 95-100. 
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Evaluation of the past credibility of institutions has consistently been a part of judicial 
reasoning. Judges often conduct a qualitative balancing exercise involving positive and 
negative evidence of reliability. Courts have assessed the past achievements and credibility of 
expert witnesses and accordingly adjusted the weight of their evidence.89 Also, not long ago 
the court in AS & DD (Libya) assessed the credibility of the late Gaddafi, and in light of his 
bad track record in unjustly convicting the ‘Bulgarian medics’, decided that his assurances to 
the UK government should not be trusted this time. 90 These cases demonstrate that courts are 
equipped  to  consider  and  are  familiar  with  evaluating  an  institution’s  historical  success. 
Of course, it may be simpler to evaluate the past record of an individual witness than to 
evaluate that of a large institution which is reliant on intelligence provided by another large 
institution. However, there is no reason to believe that courts are unable to conduct the 
balancing exercise in relation to the latter institutions. The key for courts in assessing the 
track records of government bodies is to first identify which institution(s) the court is being 
asked to defer to, and for what judgments. The government/court can then 
demonstrate/ascertain the reliability of the institution(s) in question using the following 
sources. The weight of these sources would depend on their recentness, comprehensiveness 
and independence: 
1. Reports issued by or records kept by the institution itself; 
2. Reports or statements of evaluation issued by the institution’s  monitoring  organs,  such  
as courts or parliamentary committees; 




In the following, I will use an example to illustrate how my proposals can be implemented.  
The example is adapted from the facts of Belmarsh, a case concerning national security – a 
context that raises most pertinent issues about feasibility. The aim of this section is to 
illustrate the approach which courts and government bodies can adopt in assessing and 
demonstrating past performance. The aim is not to show that track records can definitely be 
established in the given case. For instance, I will highlight the kinds of positive evidence that 
the government may adduce to demonstrate its credibility, but whether credibility can be 
                                                 
89 Eg Re AB (child abuse: expert witnesses) [1994] EWHC Fam 5, where the court refused to trust an expert 
witness since his credibility was criticised in previous cases. 
90 AS & DD (Libya) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 289 at [72-73]. 
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successfully established in practice will depend on whether the government is willing and 
able to proffer the suggested evidence. If the government is unwilling or unable to do so, my 
theory counsels courts not to defer in the case under discussion.  
Assume that the Home Secretary argues before the court that there is a ‘public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation’ that justifies indefinite detention of non-national 
terrorist suspects. The Home Secretary cites September 11th and the London bombings to 
support his claim that the said level of emergency exists, but argues that further intelligence 
gathered from the Security Service and Secret Intelligence Service which supports the claim 
cannot be revealed to the court, and that in any case, the court must defer to him, who 
possesses general expertise in making national security risk assessments. The judge weighs 
these  arguments  against  the  litigant’s.  If  the  court  is  unsure  which  way  the  argument  should  
go, my proposal would become relevant. 
Applying  my  theory,  before  the  court  can  allow  the  government’s  bold  claims  of  useful  
secret information and general expertise to add weight to its case, the court must probe the 
evidential basis of such claims. The court needs to interrogate the Home Secretary on why the 
intelligence cannot be disclosed and compel him to reveal as much evidence as possible. 
Having identified the institutions that it is being asked to defer to (ie the Home Secretary, 
Security Service and Secret Intelligence Service), the court should assess, inter alia, whether 
the   intelligence   agencies’   sources   of   intelligence   had   been   reliable,   and  whether   the  Home  
Secretary had previously made accurate and honest risk assessments based on that 
information.  
If at this stage, the government refuses to produce any evidence to prove such record of 
reliability, then the question of second-order deference ends here: the court should simply not 
grant the said assertions of institutional competence. Yet if the government is ready to try to 
establish such credibility, here are some suggestions on the kinds of affirmative evidence it 
can seek to adduce. As contended by one of the monitoring organs over the intelligence 
agencies – the ISC, data on conviction of terrorists who were arrested on the basis of 
evidence collected by the intelligence agencies demonstrates how well these agencies are 
functioning, how adequate their strategies are and what changes have to be made.91 It is thus 
an objective indicator of whether our intelligence sources are generally reliable, and is 
relevant to the court in evaluating the reliability of   the   government’s   risk   assessments, 
regardless of whether the case in question is concerned with the criminal justice system. Of 
                                                 
91 Above n 82-84. 
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course, these figures show just a small part of the capabilities of the intelligence agencies, 
because the government often has to act before it has secured enough evidence to support 
criminal charges. Yet they are an important indicator of the reliability of intelligence sources 
which the government can conveniently reveal. 
The Home Secretary may also try to produce other evidence of past intelligence 
successes and accurate risk assessments. For example, he may seek to provide particulars of 
intelligence successes that had previously been documented in the public domain, including 
the  recent  revelation  of  Iran’s  secret  nuclear site at Qom;92 the interception of two explosive 
devices concealed in air freight in 2010;93 and the disruption of an Al Qaeda cell in North 
West England in 2009.94 
Not all of the above   evidence   of   ‘success’ will attract equal weight in the   court’s  
appraisal of the government’s  ability  to  make  risk  assessments.  As explained in section 3(b), 
the more resemblance the past judgment bears to the present judgment – that of assessing 
whether there is a requisite level of public emergency – the more weight it should attract. The 
more particularised and recent the   ‘success’,   the   more   weight   it   should   attract. What the 
conviction statistics and examples of intelligence success in the public domain indicate is, the 
government may be able to adduce and particularise at least some evidence to show why its 
intelligence and risk assessments are worth relying on in specific cases. 
After the government has demonstrated positive evidence, the litigant bears the burden 
of exposing the negative track records of the Home Secretary and intelligence agencies, and 
most importantly, to highlight the institutional problems that they uncovered. The litigant 
may refer to recent criticisms made by courts against the good faith and competence of 
Security Service officials,95 the reliability of the Home Secretary’s  risk  assessments96 and the 
Home   Secretary’s competence in making national security judgments.97 Yet the most 
compelling evidence that the litigant may raise would be the findings of public inquiries over 
major intelligence failures such as the Iraq war in 2003. Public inquiries are a particularly 
valuable means of ascertaining the credibility of intelligence and risk-assessing institutions, 
                                                 
92 ‘Justice  and  Security  Green  Paper’,  presented  to  Parliament  by  the  Secretary of State for Justice, October 
2011, available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm81/8194/8194.pdf, p 4. 
93 Ibid. 
94 ‘The  Threat  to  National  Security’,  address  by the Director General of the Security Service, Jonathan Evans, at 
the Worshipful Company of Security Professionals, 16 September 2010, para 11, available at 
https://www.mi5.gov.uk.  
95 Binyam Mohamed v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2010] EWCA Civ 65 at [168].  
96 AS & DD (Libya), above n 90 at [73].  
97 Lord Alton of Liverpool v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Nov 30, 2007).  See also R (on the 
application of Al-Sweady) v Secretary of State for Defence, [2009] EWHC 1687 (Admin) at [23].  
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because they uncover much non-disclosed information, and are generally conducted 
relatively independently. Tomkins argued in the context of the Scott Inquiry that important 
lessons  can  be   learnt   from  the  report:   ‘Before  Scott  we  might  have  suspected   that  Britain’s  
security and secret intelligence services were not being used as efficiently as they might be, 
but again, we could not tell for sure. Now we can, and now that Scott has filled in some of the 
gaps, we are for the first time in a position to know a little more about what we can actually 
do about it.’98 Public inquiries into the Iraq fiasco in 2003 confirmed suspicions of 
institutional problems in our intelligence machinery, some of which were subsequently 
openly admitted by the then Prime Minister.99 These problems include:100 lengthy reporting 
chains, under-resourced validation process, compartmentalisation of intelligence, over-
reaction to past under-estimates;;  and  the  executive’s  omission of important information in the 
dossier, calling into question the  executive’s  integrity. Academics, journalists and the general 
public have taken these problems into account in evaluating our intelligence agencies and 
politicians. Naturally, the courts, being the major monitoring organ of these institutions, 
should not turn a blind eye to these glaring records when deciding whether to grant the 
government the benefit of the doubt where human rights of the litigant are at stake.  
Once the litigant has demonstrated negative track records, the onus shifts to the Home 
Secretary to reaffirm the reliability of his risk assessments and intelligence sources. He can 
do so by showing that the institutional problems raised by the litigant have been solved, are 
not relevant to the case in question or have been misidentified. For instance, the government 
may wish to give particulars of how relevant recommendations in the Butler report have been 
implemented,101 and how recent reforms to the intelligence machinery (such as the 
establishment of the National Security Council)102 have alleviated problems of the   court’s  
concern in the present case. My conjecture is this will be an uphill battle for the government, 
given the recentness of the negative incidents, and concerns expressed by the ISC that certain 
                                                 
98 A Tomkins, The Constitution After Scott (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) p 1. 
99 ‘The   Butler   Report:   Britain’s   Iraq   intelligence   falls   short’   (CBC   News,   28   June   2004),   available   at  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/Iraq/butler_report.html. 
100 Numerous inquiries have been held on pre-Iraq war intelligence. Eg the Butler Review (14 July 2004), 
available at http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf, see esp paras 108-
117; the Chilcott Inquiry: http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/. 
101 The Chief of the Security  Intelligence  Service  was  ‘confident’ that the Butler recommendations have been 
implemented:  ‘Britain’s  Secret  Frontline’,  address  by  Sir John Sawers, 28th October 2010,  available at 
https://www.sis.gov.uk/. We will have a better picture of whether they truly are once the Chilcott Inquiry 
delivers its findings.  
102 This body comprises top officials from departments responsible for national security. It was established to 
coordinate efforts. See: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/national-security-council/. 
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Butler recommendations have not been implemented.103 It is in the end for the court to 
qualitatively evaluate whether it is safe to trust that the Home Secretary indeed possesses the 
said intelligence and has accurately assessed the emergency level that UK is facing, all things 
considered. 
 
REVISITING THE DEBATE 
 
Two curious observations on the current debate culminate from the above discussion. Firstly, 
while deference on second-order institutional grounds is theoretically warranted in situations 
of judicial uncertainty, in reality – at least insofar as government institutions in contemporary 
UK are concerned – it will likely only be justified exceptionally in national security contexts, 
since it will likely be difficult to establish second-order grounds in these cases. This is 
contrary to Kavanagh’s  stance that deference is most warranted in national security contexts. 
So  while  Allan’s  starting  premise  – that courts should never defer on second-order grounds – 
is theoretically indefensible, the practical implications of his theory in this area are probably 
closer to the incidence of deference warranted,  as  compared  to  that  of  Kavanagh’s  theory.  
Secondly, at least King   and   Kavanagh’s   accounts   of deference fall prey   to   Allan’s  
criticisms against deference theories, being that they encourage abdication of judicial 
responsibility and impartiality and hinder the growth of a culture of justification 
(corresponding to the requirements of rationality, judicial fairness and open justice). As 
demonstrated in section 3(c), King   and   Kavanagh’s accounts breach all or some of these 
requirements because they grant second-order grounds of institutional capacity leniently. So 
Allan’s  conclusion on the problems of prevalent accounts of due deference is ultimately valid 
at least against two accounts, not because, as his premise states, deference for second-order 
reasons itself leads to such problems, but because these accounts omit the need for courts to 
openly consider various factors in establishing such reasons. 
That certain elements   of   Allan’s   case   remain   undamaged despite its flawed starting 
premise should not be surprising, given that an assumption underlying Allan’s  theory  is valid, 
namely, any discussion of deference must take into account the requirements of rational, 
impartial, and transparent adjudication in a rights-based democracy. This article has sought to 
answer the two questions posed at the beginning in a way that remains faithful to these 
imperatives. It has argued that firstly, rationality warrants deference on second-order grounds 
                                                 
103 ISC, ‘Report  into the  London  Terrorist  Attacks  on  7  July  2005’,  presented  to  Parliament  in  May  2006,  p  32. 
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of institutional competence in situations of judicial uncertainty. Secondly, the government 
must prove the existence of such grounds, and the court must openly consider numerous 
factors including  the  government’s  past  performance in assessing whether such grounds exist. 
It is hoped that this article could provide courts with more guidance as to when to defer in 
HRA cases. At the very least, it is hoped that this article has shown that (1) the debate on 
deference on the ground of institutional capacity is not yet resolved, and (2) the question of 
when courts  can  legitimately  trust  the  government’s  claims  of  secret  information and general 
expertise deserves more attention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
